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In 1971 Judith Jarvis
Thomson first set forth her (in)famous Violinist argument in
support of women's right to abortion.
I propose, then, that
we grant that the fetus is a person from the moment of
conception. . . . But now let me ask you to imagine this.
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back
in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious
violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment,
and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available
records and found that you alone have the right blood
type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and
last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged
into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract
poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director
of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the
Society of Music Lovers did this to you -- we would never
have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did
it, and the violinist now is plugged into you.
To unplug you would be to kill
him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By
then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can
safely be unplugged from you." Is
it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?
No doubt it would very nice of you if you did, a great
kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if
it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer
still? What if the director of the hospital says, "Tough
luck, I agree, but you've now got to stay in bed, with
the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your
life. Because remember this: all persons have a right
to life, and violinists are persons.
Granted you have a right to decide
what happens in and to your body, but a person's right
to life outweighs your right to decide what happens
in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged
from him." I imagine you would regard this as outrageous.
. . . |
The central feature of the argument
is the premise that, even though the fetus is a person, it is
sometimes morally permissible to terminate its life. While her
argument shares a key premise with the classic 'pro-life' argument
-the fetus is a human being endowed with the right to life superceding
all other rights save the woman's right to life- Thomson contends
that the woman's right to autonomy is more important than the
fetus's right to life. In this paper I will attempt to analyze
both Thomson's argument and, to a much lesser extent, the pro-life
argument.
In her 'violinist' scenario, someone else's circulatory system
is plugged into yours against your will so that your kidneys
can filter both blood streams. Disconnection means death to the
violinist, the someone plugged into you. The term of servitude
may be nine months, nine years or for the rest of your life.
Thomson states that, while it would be admirable to allow the
other person the use if your kidneys, it is by no means required
of you. In the case of pregnancy, the fetus takes the role of
the violinist. The fetus is attached to the woman and totally
dependant on her for the first nine months of its life. Separation
(or abortion) spells the death of the fetus. Carrying it to term
would certainly be a great act of kindness, but it is not required.
The woman has the final say on what happens to and in her body.
The idea if independence being paramount to the right to life
of the fetus is very much at odds with the classic pro-life argument.
Thomson addresses this at length.
Does the fetus's right to life actually supercede all other
concerns save the mother's right to life? Is the mother required
to do everything possible to ensure that the fetus stays alive
as long as possible? Thomson would say no. She holds that this
attitude arises from a misunderstanding of the concept of the
'right to life'. It is not an inalienable right to be freely
given anything needed for the continuation of your life. Rather,
the right to life consists of the right to not be killed unjustly.
In the case of the kidney squatting violinist, he does not have
any right at all to the use of your kidneys if you do not first
give him the right. In disconnecting yourself from him, you would
kill him, but as he has already unjustly connected himself (or
had himself connected) to you, your action would simply be to
right a wrong done unto you. It is an unfortunate consequence
that the violinist dies in the process.
Of course it may be said that the case of pregnancy is entirely
different from the violinist. In the latter, the victim has been
acted upon against his will, while (except in the case of rape)
the woman voluntarily enters into an act that could result in
the conception of a fetus. Thomson tackles this concern by explaining
that the intention of an act can be very different from its actual
consequences. She gives the examples of leaving a window open
to let the breeze in and later a burglar slips in, too. It is
absurd to say that the resident has given the burglar the right
to enter the house just because the avenue of entry was opened.
She goes on to alter the role of the burglar, who intentionally
seeks to enter the house, with that of an innocent individual
who accidentally blunders in. She describes the scenario as 'people-seeds'
drifting in the air. The resident can erect the most elaborate
deterrents possible (screens, filters, etc.) but, inevitably,
some 'seeds' will find their way through. Thomson would say that
these have no right to take root in the house simply because
the barriers contained flaws. Some may argue that in order to
eliminate the possibility of 'contamination' by 'people-seeds',
one should live in a sealed house with no carpet or furniture
so that the seeds have no entry or places to grow. The same could
be said of women: If they don't want to get pregnant, stay home
(an impenetrable fortress? a deserted island?) and undergo sterilization
procedures to remove any possibility whatsoever of getting pregnant.
While Thomson argues that the perpetrator of the act, whether
they be burglars or spermatozoa, have no right to do what they
do without permission or having been given the right, she puts
forth the idea of the 'Minimally Decent Samaritan". At some point
the abridgment of the 'victims' right becomes smaller than the
rights of the perpetrator. Thomson says that if the violinist
only needed to be connected to your kidneys an hour to be cured
and your health would be in no way permanently affected, in fact
the only thing you would have to endure is being inconvenienced
for an hour. It would be indecent of you to refuse him the use
of your kidneys; you ought to help him. But, that said,
you are still not morally required to do anything to help the
dying violinist. It would be deplorable and even despicable to
refuse to lift a finger to help someone in need, but the important
thing is, it isn't required. I feel that Thomson introduces this
concept due to the fact that, like most compassionate human beings,
she is appalled with the senseless killing of another human life.
Again, though, she holds that sometimes the killing is justified
and that the continued action of the individual killed is more
unjust than the death.
The chief difference between Thomson's view and the pro-life
view is that of obligation. Thomson holds that we are not obligated
to give whatever is needed to sustain another's life while the
pro-lifers at least say that we are morally required to give
aid or withhold harm from the unborn fetus. In the end, Thomson's
Violinist argument seems to be a good one. It addresses the issue
of whether or not it is morally permissible to abort a fetus
and does succeed in defending her claim that it is sometimes
morally permissible to abort the fetus. While the metaphor may
be a bit stretched with the violinist (who has already been living)
and the fetus (who has not previously existed), it still has
much merit. The issue of whether the woman's rights to her body
are more important than the fetus's right to life can be examined.
Thomson's Violinist argument has been praised by some and abhorred
by others. I feel that her's is one of the better arguments put
forth in support of abortion. She side-steps the issue of the
fetus's designation as a human being (a source of much controversy
between the pro-life and pro-choice camps) by arguing in such
a way that it doesn't matter one way or the other. The other
being does not have a right to use anything needed to prolong
(or begin) its life.
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