By Thomas Willetts

In 1971 Judith Jarvis Thomson first set forth her (in)famous Violinist argument in support of women's right to abortion.

The central feature of the argument is the premise that, even though the fetus is a person, it is sometimes morally permissible to terminate its life. While her argument shares a key premise with the classic 'pro-life' argument -the fetus is a human being endowed with the right to life superceding all other rights save the woman's right to life- Thomson contends that the woman's right to autonomy is more important than the fetus's right to life. In this paper I will attempt to analyze both Thomson's argument and, to a much lesser extent, the pro-life argument.

In her 'violinist' scenario, someone else's circulatory system is plugged into yours against your will so that your kidneys can filter both blood streams. Disconnection means death to the violinist, the someone plugged into you. The term of servitude may be nine months, nine years or for the rest of your life. Thomson states that, while it would be admirable to allow the other person the use if your kidneys, it is by no means required of you. In the case of pregnancy, the fetus takes the role of the violinist. The fetus is attached to the woman and totally dependant on her for the first nine months of its life. Separation (or abortion) spells the death of the fetus. Carrying it to term would certainly be a great act of kindness, but it is not required. The woman has the final say on what happens to and in her body. The idea if independence being paramount to the right to life of the fetus is very much at odds with the classic pro-life argument. Thomson addresses this at length.

Does the fetus's right to life actually supercede all other concerns save the mother's right to life? Is the mother required to do everything possible to ensure that the fetus stays alive as long as possible? Thomson would say no. She holds that this attitude arises from a misunderstanding of the concept of the 'right to life'. It is not an inalienable right to be freely given anything needed for the continuation of your life. Rather, the right to life consists of the right to not be killed unjustly. In the case of the kidney squatting violinist, he does not have any right at all to the use of your kidneys if you do not first give him the right. In disconnecting yourself from him, you would kill him, but as he has already unjustly connected himself (or had himself connected) to you, your action would simply be to right a wrong done unto you. It is an unfortunate consequence that the violinist dies in the process.

Of course it may be said that the case of pregnancy is entirely different from the violinist. In the latter, the victim has been acted upon against his will, while (except in the case of rape) the woman voluntarily enters into an act that could result in the conception of a fetus. Thomson tackles this concern by explaining that the intention of an act can be very different from its actual consequences. She gives the examples of leaving a window open to let the breeze in and later a burglar slips in, too. It is absurd to say that the resident has given the burglar the right to enter the house just because the avenue of entry was opened. She goes on to alter the role of the burglar, who intentionally seeks to enter the house, with that of an innocent individual who accidentally blunders in. She describes the scenario as 'people-seeds' drifting in the air. The resident can erect the most elaborate deterrents possible (screens, filters, etc.) but, inevitably, some 'seeds' will find their way through. Thomson would say that these have no right to take root in the house simply because the barriers contained flaws. Some may argue that in order to eliminate the possibility of 'contamination' by 'people-seeds', one should live in a sealed house with no carpet or furniture so that the seeds have no entry or places to grow. The same could be said of women: If they don't want to get pregnant, stay home (an impenetrable fortress? a deserted island?) and undergo sterilization procedures to remove any possibility whatsoever of getting pregnant.

While Thomson argues that the perpetrator of the act, whether they be burglars or spermatozoa, have no right to do what they do without permission or having been given the right, she puts forth the idea of the 'Minimally Decent Samaritan". At some point the abridgment of the 'victims' right becomes smaller than the rights of the perpetrator. Thomson says that if the violinist only needed to be connected to your kidneys an hour to be cured and your health would be in no way permanently affected, in fact the only thing you would have to endure is being inconvenienced for an hour. It would be indecent of you to refuse him the use of your kidneys; you ought to help him. But, that said, you are still not morally required to do anything to help the dying violinist. It would be deplorable and even despicable to refuse to lift a finger to help someone in need, but the important thing is, it isn't required. I feel that Thomson introduces this concept due to the fact that, like most compassionate human beings, she is appalled with the senseless killing of another human life. Again, though, she holds that sometimes the killing is justified and that the continued action of the individual killed is more unjust than the death.

The chief difference between Thomson's view and the pro-life view is that of obligation. Thomson holds that we are not obligated to give whatever is needed to sustain another's life while the pro-lifers at least say that we are morally required to give aid or withhold harm from the unborn fetus. In the end, Thomson's Violinist argument seems to be a good one. It addresses the issue of whether or not it is morally permissible to abort a fetus and does succeed in defending her claim that it is sometimes morally permissible to abort the fetus. While the metaphor may be a bit stretched with the violinist (who has already been living) and the fetus (who has not previously existed), it still has much merit. The issue of whether the woman's rights to her body are more important than the fetus's right to life can be examined.

Thomson's Violinist argument has been praised by some and abhorred by others. I feel that her's is one of the better arguments put forth in support of abortion. She side-steps the issue of the fetus's designation as a human being (a source of much controversy between the pro-life and pro-choice camps) by arguing in such a way that it doesn't matter one way or the other. The other being does not have a right to use anything needed to prolong (or begin) its life.